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Abstract
This paper studies gender wage di¤erentials in Italy by providing a structural
estimation of the frictional parameters of two di¤erent theoretical speci-
cations of an equilibrium search model. I alternatively allow for rm het-
erogeneity and discrimination empirically using maximum likelihood and
matching rst moments in the data. Results indicate substantial di¤erences
in transition parameters with higher level of search frictions for women. The
mapping from productivity to wages for men is highly non linear, with high
productivity rms o¤ering proportionally higher wages; for women, the rela-
tionships is almost linear. Including discrimination, I nd that productivity
accounts for 61% of the wage o¤er di¤erential, search for 28% and 11% is
the part of discrimination.
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1 Introduction
The empirical labour literature has paid particular attention to gender wage dif-
ferentials, as these have been frequently associated with discrimination in labour
markets (see Altonji and Blank, 1999). However, identication of discrimination
as source of such di¤erentials with standard econometric tools is not a simple task.
The problem is that discrimination is only one possible explanation for observed
gender wage di¤erentials; other possibilities being productivity di¤erentials and
di¤erent search behaviour of men and women.1
As a consequence, if one wants to identify a measure of discrimination, it is
di¢ cult to rely on the estimated coe¢ cient of the gender dummy in wage regres-
sions. One possibility for analysing these issues is that of using and estimating an
equilibrium search model. In that context, all three sources of wage di¤erentials
are present as an explanation for wage dispersion. What is more, estimation of
structural behavioural parameters, both with maximum likelihood techniques and
matching rst moments in the data, guarantees exact identication. Equilibrium
conditions can be then be used to decompose observed wage di¤erentials due to
search frictions, productivity di¤erentials and discrimination. Productivity and
transition probabilities di¤erentials are the two main determinants of wage di¤er-
entials across workers in equilibrium search models, both are assumed exogenous.
However, some recent contributions in the literature explicitly include another de-
terminant of wage di¤erentials: taste discrimination as studied in Becker (1971) is
a further ingredient to explain race and gender wage di¤erentials.2
The literature dealing with structural estimation of search models is now rapidly
increasing and well established (see Eckstein and Van den Berg, 2007). Despite
this fact, quite a few contributions look at gender wage di¤erentials in this spe-
cic framework. Bowlus (1997) studies gender wage di¤erentials using US data.
The paper estimates an equilibrium model decomposing the wage di¤erential into
productivity and search components nding that productivity di¤erentials explain
about 70% of the wage gap, and the rest is search frictions. However, the pa-
per explicitly doesnt take discrimination into account. Two papers that try to
disentangle the role of unobserved productivity di¤erentials, search frictions and
discrimination are Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) and Flabbi (2005). The former
deals with race di¤erentials while the second explicitly looks at gender di¤eren-
tials. However this is not the only di¤erence between the two studies. Although
the papers share the same basic aim of disentangling di¤erentials in productiv-
1Standard wage regression control for most observable characteristics that can account for
productivity di¤erentials, i.e., human capital, experience, industy, occupation, and unobserved
heterogeneity.
2Black (1995), Sasaki (1999) and Rosen (2003) are examples of theoretical search models in
which discrimination persists in equilibrium.
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ity, search and discrimination components, they basically di¤er in the theoretical
structure and estimation approach. Both look at the share of prejudiced employers
and their disutility factor upon hiring a worker from the minority group, however,
the former uses a wage posting mechanism for wage o¤ers and doesnt have any
source of spillover e¤ect from prejudiced to unprejudiced employers; the second,
using a search-matching-bargaining framework, is able to reproduce the spillover
e¤ect. As a result, womens outside options are reduced at any employer, de-
termining wage discrimination. Finally the two papers are estimated by using
di¤erent methods. While Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) match rst moments in the
data, Flabbi (2005) estimates structural parameters by maximum likelihood. The
latter methodology is able to t the wage distribution quite satisfactorily, while
the former identies parameters assuming increasing densities for wage o¤ers and
earnings distributions.3
This paper provides a structural estimation of the relevant parameters of the
equilibrium search model with frictions by using two di¤erent theoretical struc-
tures. First a model with rm heterogeneity in productivity without discrimination
is estimated, then a model with no dispersion in productivity and discrimination
in considered. The former approach assumes men and women are in separate
labour markets and rms with di¤erent productivity o¤er di¤erent wages to work-
ers; the latter analyses a labour market in which all men and women have the same
productivity but there are gender di¤erences and discrimination. The empirical
application is performed on Italian administrative data from INPS.
In the rst part of the paper, after a non-parametric estimation of the distri-
bution of earnings; I recover a structural estimate of frictional parameters of the
equilibrium model using maximum likelihood techniques as proposed by Bontemps
et al. (2000). Conditional on previous steps, I look at the relationship between
productivity and wages separately for men and women. The second part of the
paper is devoted to estimate structural parameters matching rst moments in the
data by using again structural equilibrium relationships as proposed by Bowlus
and Eckstein (2002). In this context, I assume men and women can have di¤erent
productivity, but the distribution of productivity is not dispersed. Using their
identication strategy, a measure of the number of discriminating rms and their
disutility parameter upon employing women are estimated.
The main ndings of the paper can be summarised as follows. The job nding
rate is much higher for unemployed workers than for employed ones, both for men
and women. The former is estimated ten times higher than the latter. As a conse-
quence the frictions parameter, expressed as the ratio between the arrival rates of
3Flabbi (2007) explicitly addresses the issue of stable gender wage di¤erentials over time by
considering the role of discrimination. He concludes that the proportion of prejudiced employers
in the US drops from 70% in 1985 to 32% in 2005.
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o¤ers while employed and the job destruction rate, is very low. Important di¤er-
ences in the speed of climbing the wage ladder between men and women are found.
This quantity measure of search frictions is equal to 0.5 for men and 0.2 for women
when using maximum likelihood techniques. The mapping from productivity to
wages indicates again interesting di¤erences across workers. For men, the relation
is highly non linear, with high productivity rms o¤ering proportionally higher
wages, while for women, the relationship is almost linear. This suggest rms have
quite di¤erent wage policies in recruitment and retention for men and women. Fi-
nally, explicitly taking into account discrimination, by matching moments in the
data, results indicate the relative contribution of the search, productivity and dis-
crimination is di¤erent for the wage o¤er and earnings distribution. In the rst
case, productivity accounts for 61% of wage di¤erentials, while the part of search
is 28% and 11% is the component of discrimination. The earnings distribution is
di¤erently a¤ected: the relative contributions are 48%, 24% and 28% respectively.
Interestingly, productivity di¤erences are more relevant for wage o¤ers than for
earnings distribution, while discrimination is much more important to explain the
earnings gap. The role of search behaviour is very similar in both cases.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in section two I briey discuss the
theoretical equilibrium search model with productivity dispersion across rms and
the model with taste discrimination. Then, in section three I describe the data
and the selection of the sample. The estimation method, results and comparison
with those in the literature are also provided. In the last section, I conclude and
discuss some policy issues.
2 Theory
In this section, I provide a brief description of the equilibrium search model of
Burdett and Mortensen (1998). The model is also separately extended to include
rmsheterogeneity (Bontemps et al., 2000) and discrimination (Bowlus and Eck-
stein, 2002). Both extensions are used for empirical estimation. It is important to
stress from the onset, these are quite di¤erent representation of the labour market,
however both of them have search frictions as essential component of the model.4
Heterogeneity in productivity is essential to obtain a reasonable t of the wage
distribution and allows to analyze the relation between wages and productivity.
Men and women belong to separate labour markets in this setup. On the other
hand, including discrimination and assuming there is a fraction of rms that have
a disutility taste parameter towards women, helps to better explain the gender
wage di¤erential. However, in this case, although the model is identied, it has
4A more detailed description of models is also contained in Sulis (2007).
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the counterfactual implication of increasing densities for wage o¤er and earnings
distribution.5
2.1 Productivity Dispersion
The labour market is populated by workers and rms, the large number of identical
rms is measure 1; m is the large number of workers in the market. They are all
identical; however, some of them are employed and some others are unemployed.
Let u denote the number of unemployed. Job search can occur in both states;
the probability of receiving an o¤er is distributed according to a standard Poisson
process where u is the arrival rate of job o¤ers while unemployed and e when
employed. The search strategy has the reservation property, R is the reservation
wage when unemployed, and the wage w is the reservation wage when employed.
If unemployed a worker has utility ow given by b, the latter has the standard
interpretation as the value of leisure or the level of unemployment benet per
period. No heterogeneity in the value of leisure is assumed. When employed,
workers earn their wage w and p is the ow revenue generated per employed worker,
total surplus from matching is p b, a rm earns p w when the job is lled, while
a worker gets w  b: Exogenous productivity shocks destroy jobs with arrival rate
. It is useful to dene ku = u= and ke = e=. The latter is the key parameter
of the model and is a quantity measure of the level of search frictions in the market
(Ridder and Van den Berg, 2003).
Let F (w) represent the distribution of wages o¤ered to workers and G(w)
the distribution of wages actually paid to employed workers, i.e., the earnings
distribution. There is a structural relationship between the two regulated by search
frictions parameters that reads as
G(w) =
F (w)
1 + ke[1  F (w)] : (1)
The fraction of workers receiving a wage less or equal to w is given by the fraction
of rms o¤ering that particular wage (or less) divided by the probability that the
job is either destroyed for exogenous reasons or the worker quits for a better o¤er.
This is the most important relationship that I use in the empirical application.
Firms post wage in the support of the wage o¤er distribution F (w). Denote
l(wjR;F ) as the measure of workers per rm earning a wage w given R and F:
That species the steady state number of workers available to a rm o¤ering a
particular wage conditional on the wage o¤ered by other rms, represented by F;
and the workersreservation wage R. Firms can o¤er higher wages and make less
5To the best of my knowledge, no attempt has been made to model both rmsheterogeneity
and discrimination.
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prots per workers but increase l(w); viceversa, o¤ering lower wages make more
prots per worker but face more turnover.
Finally, following Bontemps et al. (2000), assume now that rms are heteroge-
neous with respect to their labour productivity parameter p: In this setting, rms
maximise prot by choosing w; given productivity. From the rst order condition
of the rm maximisation problem, it is then possible to determine the rms value
of the exogenous productivity parameter at each rm
p = w +
1 + keG(w)
2keg(w)
: (2)
The parameter p is an important measure of the marginal product of a worker in
a competitive equilibrium. As search frictions vanish, the parameter ke increases,
and the gap between wages and productivity disappears. It is important to stress,
the distribution of productivity is assumed to be exogenous and there is no other
production factor in the model. Firm heterogeneity is essential to get a good t
of the wage distribution.
2.2 Discrimination
In what follows, I discuss in more detail the model when discrimination is explicitly
taken into account as proposed by Bowlus and Eckstein (2002). In this case, there
are two types of workers, M and W . There is a proportion  of the latter and
1   of the former. Workers di¤er by gender and productivity with PM  PW as
type M workers can have higher skill level.6 Firms maximise utility that depends
on prots and preferences over type of workers. There is a fraction d of rms
having a disutility d upon hiring a typeW worker, while the remaining proportion
is unprejudiced rms. Both  and d are exogenously given. In this setting arrival
rates are inuenced by preferences of employers towards workerstypes. To model
this, a proportional factor 0  x  1 is added to the model. If x = 0, prejudiced
rms do not search for W type workers, while if x = 1 (d = 0 and d = 0) arrival
rates are the same across workers. In general, arrival rates di¤er by x. Exogenous
job destruction rates di¤er by assumption W  M :
In this context, rms can post di¤erent wages for each type of worker. What is
more, since rmsprots are additive in workerstypes, it is possible to solve sep-
arately for ows and wage o¤er distributions for each workers type. In particular,
for workers of typeM , both prejudiced and unprejudiced rms post the same wage
o¤er distribution; the latter is equal as the one in Burdett and Mortensen (1998),
with increasing o¤er and earnings densities. Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) show that
6Productivity is denoted by capital letters to stress the fact all workers of the same gender
have the same productivity.
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wage distributions for type W workers is a (non degenerate) mixture of two dis-
tinct distributions, in which prejudiced rms o¤er lower wages, and unprejudiced
rms o¤er higher wages. In this context, productivity di¤erentials inuence the
conditional mean of the distribution, while discrimination determines the bottom
of the wage distribution.
The identication strategy is based on the following idea. In the case of pure
productivity di¤erentials, distributions are identical, but the one for men is shifted
to the right, so that the distance is determined by the di¤erence between produc-
tivities; in the case of discrimination, the distance is determined by the number
of prejudiced rms, by the disutility parameter, and by the di¤erence in recruit-
ment activity of rms for men and women. Predictions regarding the evolution
of the di¤erential as one moves to the top of the distributions are di¤erent in the
pure productivity case and the pure discrimination case. The model is able to
characterise wage, job duration and unemployment di¤erentials across men and
women.
3 Empirical Analysis
The empirical estimation of equilibrium search models as Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) is mainly based on workers data. Necessary information for empirical
analysis is observed duration in unemployment and employment, accepted and
earned wages, and exit state after employment. The relevant unknown parameters
to be estimated are: b, the workerscommon value of leisure or non market time;
p, the rmscommon value of productivity; the two ratios ku and ke (or u and e
alternatively); and the job separation (or destruction) rate . If b is unobserved
then, R is the fth parameter.
However, the model in its simple version has the well-known counterfactual
implication that theoretical densities for wage o¤er and earnings distribution are
increasing and left skewed. The predicted shape is di¤erent from the expected
cross sectional earnings distribution observed in the data, characterised by a very
long right tail. As discussed in section 2.1, to t the real wage distribution some
heterogeneity in rm productivity is needed. This allows to obtain a reasonable
t and also, exploiting structural equilibrium relations, obtain a measure of pro-
ductivity at each rm.
If discrimination is considered, identication is still possible, but the model
has the same counterfactual implication of the standard Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) model. In this case, men and women can have di¤erent search parameters
and di¤erent productivity. Before discussing in detail the estimation methods and
identication issues, in the next subsection, I briey present the data.
7
3.1 Data
In this study, I use a matched employer-employee data base from Italian Ad-
ministrative Archives representative of the population of employed workers in the
private non-farm sector. The source of information is the National Social Security
Institute (INPS).7 In this data, as in other matched employer-employee data sets,
each worker and each rm are identied by a specic code during their permanence
in the administrative les. For every match, a new code, composed of the union
of the rm and worker codes, is created. As the match is destroyed, the worker
and the rm still continue maintaining their previous code. This data contains
all the relevant information I need to estimate an equilibrium search model.8 For
workers, information on sex, age, tenure, number of weeks paid and wages earned
is available. On the rm side, it is possible to have information on the size of the
workforce (average number of employees during the year), the (mean) earnings of
those workers, the geographical location, and the sector of activity.9
No information regarding education is available. However, the main di¢ culty
with this data set is related to the denition of the status of a worker and his/her
classication. While the position while employed is illuminating about the actual
position in the labour market, on the other hand, if the worker exits the market,
it is impossible to know if the subsequent period of absence from the records is
due to unemployment, work in the public sector, self-employment or retirement.
Although in the paper I refer to unemployment for exposition reasons, it is im-
portant to remember that this state has to be interpreted as out of sample.
Finally, as is common in most administrative datasets, no information is provided
about the nature of job separation, i.e., it is not possible knowing exactly if the
worker has been laid o¤ or the end of the job has been determined by a voluntary
separation. In what follows I carefully explain how these problems are overcome
in the empirical application.
To estimate the relevant parameters of the equilibrium search model I use a
sub-sample of workers observed during a the period 1985-1996. I look at the
current status of all workers in the sample in February 1991. Workers are then
classied as employed or unemployed. For each worker I observe elapsed and
residual duration in the state (employment or unemployment), the wage actually
earned or accepted when exiting unemployment and, for those employed, the next
transition to another job or unemployment (or censoring).
In Tables 1 and 2 I report descriptive statistics for the sample used in the
7See Casavola et al. (1999) and Contini (2002) for a description of the dataset.
8Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) estimate their equilibrium search model using the French
Administrative DADS panel. The two datasets share the same advantages and disadvantages.
9It is possible to have information on wages earned on a yearly and weekly base. Using other
information regarding days worked it is straightforward to have also monthly and daily wages.
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estimation. I restrict my attention to workers aged 15-50 and divide them in
three age groups. Apprentices are excluded as are part time workers. Finally
I trim the lowest 1% and highest 99% of mens and womens tails of the overall
monthly wage distribution.10 Some remarkable di¤erences emerge confronting men
and women. First, the proportion of unemployed is higher for the latter, about
19% against 16%; second, the duration of unemployment is slightly higher, one
month on average. Average wages are about 22% higher for men, and dispersion
is also higher with the percentile ratio equal to 2.35 against 2.09. I now turn to
describe the estimation method used for structural parameters and productivity
distributions.11
3.2 Likelihood Function
The estimation method used in this section is based on Bontemps et al. (2000).
I refer to this method as a nonparametric one. Workers can be employed or
unemployed. To denote their status in February 1991, I use a binary variable i =
0; 1. Employment and unemployment durations are dened by ti, the subscripts b
and f stand for backward and forward respectively, to denote durations before and
after February 1991. Then, tib and tif represent durations with i = 0; 1: Dene
left and right censored observations for those spells in progress in January 1985
and December 1996. Let dib and dif denote those indicators. For each worker in
the sample I observe either the wage paid in February 1991 w1; or accepted wage
upon exiting unemployment w0. As Eckstein and Van den Berg (2007) claim,
the former is a random draw from G while the latter is a random draw from F .
Workers employed in February 1991 can subsequently exit to another job (job-to-
job transition) or to unemployment. Following Contini (2002), I arbitrarily dene
as job-to-job transitions those moves with an intervening period of unemployment
less or equal to one month.12
The likelihood function is derived by strictly following the theoretical model
and multiplying individual observations. In this model, unemployment duration
has exponential distribution with parameter u; the probability of a draw for
unemployed workers is u=m = 1=(1 + ku). Finally, when the worker leaves unem-
ployment, he/she draws from the wage o¤er distribution F (w). For this group of
10Following Contini (2002), yearly wages are deated with the CPI at 1996 prices. Then, to
make them comparable across workers with di¤erent number of days worked during the year, the
following adjustment is adopted: realwage=(yearly wage/days paid)*26 where 26 is the average
number of days worked during the month. The overall sample selection procedure is available
upon request.
11In Sulis (2004), I use this estimation procedure to analyse regional labour market di¤erentials.
Results for men are also reported in that paper.
12See also Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) for French data.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Men
All Sample B lue Collars W hite Collars M anagers 15-25 26-40 41-50
Number of Workers 60,506 41,223 18,819 464 12,904 31,042 16,523
Unemployed 16.48% 19.37% 10.40% 5.60% 34.10% 14.41% 6.42%
Employed 83.52% 80.63% 89.60% 94.40% 65.90% 85.59% 93.58%
Age: m ean (std dev) 33.75 (8.75) 32.94 (8.91) 35.32 (8.11) 41.69 (5.97) 22.51 (2.07) 32.34 (4.31) 45.20 (2.80)
Unemployed
left censored 36% 34% 44% 23% 43% 31% 23%
right censored 15% 15% 13% 15% 14% 16% 14%
Duration (not censored)
m ean (std dev) 24.37 (21.42) 24.18 (25.30) 25.30 (21.96) 24.41 (21.22) 23.44 (20.57) 25.19 (22.15) 24.22 (21.25)
Employed
Transitions e! e 13% 13% 12% 12% 15% 14% 10%
Transitions e! u 87% 87% 88% 88% 85% 86% 90%
left censored 25% 23% 27% 28% 1% 24% 40%
right censored 41% 39% 46% 43% 29% 43% 45%
Duration (not censored)
m ean (std dev) - tota l 47.10 (32.01) 44.40 (31.46) 53.03 (32.41) 62.33 (31.16) 35.01 (25.44) 47.75 (31.55) 58.82 (34.72)
if transition e! e 25.67 (20.18) 24.39 (19.37) 28.55 (20.90) 34.75 (20.40) 26.09 (15.07) 26.75 (20.69) 30.68 (23.13)
if transition e! u 50.44 (32.22) 47.55 (31.80) 56.78 (32.23) 65.63 (30.62) 37.62 (25.98) 51.14 (31.69) 61.99 (34.36)
Wage D istribution
m in imum 974 975 974 1166 978 974 977
p10 2139 2068 2455 6407 1972 2176 2426
m edian 3032 2807 3856 9017 2527 3053 3542
p90 5030 3974 6477 11164 3480 4913 6083
p90/p10 2.35 1.92 2.63 1.74 1.76 2.25 2.50
m ean (std dev) 3386 (1440) 2941 (891) 4227 (1726) 8749 (2059) 2468 (762) 3372 (1341) 3992 (1723)
Durations are expressed in months. M onetary values are in 000s of Ita lian L ira .
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Women
All Sample B lue Collars W hite Collars 15-25 26-40 41-50
Number of Workers 34,514 15,110 19,404 10065 18228 6203
Unemployed 18.69% 21.28% 16.67% 28.96% 16.09% 9.45%
Employed 81.31% 78.72% 83.33% 71.04% 83.91% 90.55%
Age: m ean (std dev) 31.41 (8.30) 31.73 (9.04) 31.16 (7.67) 22.44 (2.00) 31.75 (4.26) 45.00 (2.83)
Unemployed
left censored 42% 40% 45% 54% 33% 34%
right censored 19% 21% 16% 15% 20% 30%
Duration (not censored)
m ean (std dev) 25.40 (21.45) 25.86 (20.83) 24.93 (22.06) 23.76 (20.67) 26.64 (22.13) 25.40 (20.30)
Employed
Transitions e! e 11% 9% 12% 13% 11% 8%
Transitions e! u 89% 91% 88% 87% 89% 92%
left censored 22% 24% 21% 3% 25% 40%
right censored 36% 35% 37% 30% 37% 42%
Duration (not censored)
m ean (std dev) - tota l 46.13 (31.39) 46.19 (31.21) 46.08 (31.53) 40.56 (27.95) 46.30 (31.79) 58.39 (33.84)
if transition e! e 24.90 (20.35) 26.45 (20.69) 24.04 (20.12) 22.65 (17.98) 25.25 (21.08) 30.60 (22.85)
if transition e! u 48.79 (31.52) 48.25 (31.41) 49.21 (31.61) 43.06 (28.19) 48.95 (31.92) 61.02 (33.53)
Wage D istribution
m in imum 835 835 835 835 835 838
p10 1877 1750 1999 1832 1887 1986
m edian 2573 2313 2840 2362 2659 2804
p90 3936 3164 4322 3343 4034 4391
p90/p10 2.09 1.80 2.16 1.82 2.13 2.21
m ean (std dev) 2760 (945) 2399 (694) 3042 (1015) 2479 (711) 2829 (973) 3017 (1073)
Durations are expressed in months. M onetary values are in 000s of Ita lian L ira .
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workers, the likelihood is
2 d0b d0fu
(1 + ku)
exp [ u(t0b + t0f )] f(w0)1 d0f : (3)
The probability of sampling an employed individual is 1   u=m = ku=(1 + ku).
The job duration, given the wage w1; is exponentially distributed with parameter
, while the employment relationship has exponential duration with parameter
+eF (w1), where F (w1) = 1 F (w): The likelihood for employed workers reads
as
ku
(1 + ku)
g(w)

 + eF (w1)
1 d1b
exp
   + eF (w1) (t1b + t1f )	nv eF (w1)1 vo1 d1f ;
(4)
where v is equal to 0 if the employment relationship is voluntary terminated with
a quit and 1 if there is a layo¤.
When heterogeneity in productivity is considered, the model is identied as
follows. Frictional parameters u; e; and  are identied from unemployment
durations, employment durations terminating into another job and those termi-
nating to unemployment respectively. The reservation wage R is identied as the
lowest wage observed in the sample. Finally, the distribution of productivity can
be identied by using wage data and estimated frictional parameters (see Eckstein
and Van den Berg, 2007).
The nonparametric estimation procedure proposed by Bontemps et al. (2000)
can be summarised in three steps. First I estimate G(w) and g(w) using a non-
parametric procedure. I use a standard Gaussian kernel estimator for the density
and the empirical cumulative distribution for G(w). Let bG and bg denote such
estimates. Conditional on ke, consistent estimates of F and f are
bF (w) = 1  bG(w)
1 + ke bG(w) (5)
and bf(w) = 1 + keh
1 + ke bG(w)i2bg(w): (6)
Second, replace F and f in the likelihood function by the preceding expressions,
and maximize the likelihood with respect to ku, ke, and . Finally, estimate p
using the equation below
p = w +
1 + keG(w)
2keg(w)
; (7)
where p represents a rm-specic constant value of productivity.
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The estimation routine has two parts. In the rst one, transition parameters
are estimated by looking at workers and their states in the market. In the second
part, conditional on previous steps, a measure of productivity is estimated for each
rm. Note the procedure doesnt need any assumption regarding the distribution
of productivity.
3.3 Results
In this subsection, I analyse results obtained by estimating the equilibrium model
with rm heterogeneity using the nonparametric procedure discussed above. In
this case, search frictions parameters and the relationship between wages paid and
productivity are the most important results I look at. I also consider the di¤erent
role of search frictions at various experience levels for men and women.
The rst empirical test of the equilibrium search model has a theoretical moti-
vation. Equation (1) has a clear prediction about the shape of earnings and wage
o¤er distributions: the earnings distribution has to rst order stochastically dom-
inate the wage o¤er distribution. This is because there is on-the-job search and
workers can move to better paying jobs. In Figure 1 this prediction is veried with
an eyeball-test using standard kernel estimations of the two densities. For both
men and women, the earnings distribution is shifted to the right, indicating that
higher wages are more likely to be earned for those employed in February 1991
(see Christensen et al., 2005). The distribution of accepted wages after unem-
ployment is instead more concentrated at lower wages. Interestingly, the womens
o¤er distribution is bimodal, with a small group of women earning very low wages.
One plausible explanation for this is heterogeneity in reservation wages, probably
related to homework and transitions in the labour market. This nonparametric
estimation is a rst necessary step before estimating frictional parameters; it shows
interesting di¤erences between men and women.
In Tables 3 and 4 estimation results for transition parameters are presented.
Arrival rates dene transition parameters and represent probabilities of an event.
In this case, the probability of receiving an o¤er is distributed according to a
standard Poisson process where u is the arrival rate of job o¤ers while unemployed
and e when employed;  is the arrival rate of destruction rates. Interpretation
of these parameters suggests that the inverse of these is the expected duration
of unemployment and jobs. The parameter ke = e= is a quantity and it is a
measure of search frictions describing the speed at which workers climb the job
and wage ladder. As Ridder and Van den Berg (2003) suggest, ke equals the average
number of job o¤ers in a given spell of employment, since the average duration of
a spell of employment is 1=, and job o¤ers arrive according to a Poisson process
with parameter e, this quantity is the index of search frictions that enters the
distribution of wage o¤ers.
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Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimates of Earnings and Wage O¤er Distributions
mthwage
 accepted wages - f(w)  earning wages - g(w)
0 5000 10000 15000
0
.0002
.0004
.0006
Men
monthly wage
 accepted wages - f(w)  earning wages - g(w)
0 2000 4000 6000 8000
0
.0002
.0004
.0006
.0008
Women
14
Table 3: Transition Parameters, Men
 u e ke
All Sample 0.0128 0.0431 0.0064 0.5039
[0.0127, 0.0128 ] [0.0427, 0.0436] [0.0063, 0.0068] [0.4925, 0.5218]
Blue Collars 0.0139 0.0421 0.0053 0.383
[0.0138, 0.0140] [0.0415, 0.0427] [0.0051, 0.0055] [0.3742, 0.3920]
White Collars 0.0109 0.0466 0.0103 0.9472
[0.0107, 0.0111] [0.0450, 0.0484] [0.0097, 0.0108] [0.8802, 0.9953]
Managers 0.0122 0.0786 0.0655 5.3561
[0.0115, 0.0132] [0.0630, 0.1070] [0.0408, 0.1373] [3.3168, 10.892]
15-25 0.0251 0.0350 0.0079 0.3154
[0.0247, 0.0254] [0.0339, 0.0359] [0.0073, 0.0085] [0.2926, 0.3429]
26-40 0.0126 0.0475 0.0060 0.4762
[0.0124, 0.0128 ] [0.0465, 0.0483] [0.0057, 0.0063] [0.4525, 0.5114]
41-50 0.0098 0.0709 0.0040 0.4111
[0.0097, 0.0099] [0.0677, 0.0737] [0.0039, 0.0042] [0.4005, 0.4288]
Time period is month. 5% and 95% percentiles of the bootstrap distribution in square brackets.
The rst interesting result that holds for both groups is that of an arrival rate of
acceptable wage o¤ers when employed much lower than the one when unemployed;
us estimate for the all sample is almost ten times larger than e: According to
these gures, the estimated average duration of unemployment is equal to about
24 months, with a slight higher duration for women.13 On the other hand, the
average duration of an employment relationship terminated by the worker with a
quit is equal to 156 months for men and more than 310 months for women. This
indicates that on-the-job search activity is very low and that job search reveals
much more protable when unemployed. On the other hand, the job destruction
rate is estimated close to 0.012 for men and 0.015 for women, with an average
duration of the job of 83 months for males. Finally, ke = e= gives a measure of the
speed at which workers climb the wage and job ladder. It can be also interpreted
as the average number of o¤ers received in a given spell of employment. The search
frictions index is equal to 0.5 for a random male worker in this sample and to 0.2
for a representative women. Results for the overall sample highlight important
di¤erences in transition parameters between men and women. As expected, job
change behaviour seems to be inuenced by gender specic factors.
Until now, workers have been treated as homogeneous, however they certainly
13This result should be considered with a grain of salt. Remember that I refer to unemployment
for simplicity, but this state refers to out of sample condition with work in public sector, self-
employment, inactivity, and unemployment.
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Table 4: Transition Parameters, Women
 u e ke
All Sample 0.0154 0.0398 0.0032 0.2099
[0.0153, 0.0154 ] [0.0378, 0.0405] [0.0021, 0.0053] [0.1998, 0.2101]
Blue Collars 0.0158 0.0381 0.0017 0.1133
[0.0156, 0.0160] [0.0379, 0.0392] [0.0012, 0.0021] [0.1101, 0.1145]
White Collars 0.0151 0.0414 0.0056 0.3749
[0.0149, 0.0152] [0.0410, 0.0431] [0.0053, 0.0059] [0.3654, 0.3956]
15-25 0.0236 0.0332 0.0032 0.1369
[0.0233, 0.0240] [0.0329, 0.0341] [0.0022, 0.0040] [0.1298, 0.1403]
26-40 0.0148 0.0465 0.0034 0.2321
[0.0138, 0.0051] [0.0455, 0.0475] [0.0024, 0.0045] [0.2301, 0.2405]
41-50 0.0095 0.0488 0.0033 0.3466
[0.0090, 0.0099] [0.0480, 0.0497] [0.0027, 0.0040] [0.3376, 0.3501]
Time period is month. 5% and 95% percentiles of the bootstrap distribution in square brackets.
di¤er according to some observable and unobservable characteristics that a¤ect
their labour market outcomes. Stratication of the sample according to worker
characteristics can give some indication of the di¤erence in the degree of search
frictions that workers face when looking for a job. Results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate
interesting di¤erences among di¤erent occupations and age groups. Apprentices
are excluded from the sample, as are managers for women, as they are too few.
As expected, managers (only men) rank very high in the probability of getting
outside o¤ers, their estimated arrival rate of job opportunities is equal to 0.06 per
month with an average value of the search friction parameter greater than 5. On
the other hand, job destruction rates are almost constant across di¤erent groups
with a somewhat higher rate for blue collars.
Stratication by di¤erent age groups gives interesting results with higher job
destruction rate for young workers and higher probability of move for them. For
men, results in the last column of the Table also conrm well known ndings about
the concave relationship between wage and experience in the labour market, with
an increasing prole in early stages of the career and with a attening in later
stages. For women instead, the relationship is increasing with age. Looking more
in detail at estimates, note that the job destruction rate is quite similar for men
and women. On the other hand, the estimated arrival rate of o¤ers is almost
constant across age groups for women while for men is reduced as workers get
older. This result can have an interesting interpretation regarding di¤erent job
search behaviour of the two groups. While for men the career path is a standard one
with diminishing arrival rates when older; for women, the arrival rate is constant
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indicating their move can be less related to money reasons. This result can be also
attributed to the fact that, in this model, search intensity doesnt vary with the
wage, determining a constant arrival rate of o¤ers at any wage level; this e¤ect is
stronger for women.
Figure 2 looks at the estimated mapping between productivity and o¤ered
wages. The estimated relationship is increasing at all levels of productivity as pre-
dicted by the model. However, this Figure reveals interesting di¤erences among
men and women. While the relationship for men is not linear, but is best approxi-
mated by a cubic with an inection point at median productivity levels, for women
the relationship is close to a linear one. This can have important implications for
our understanding of the gender wage di¤erential.
In fact, previous results presented above conrm that men and women exhibit
important di¤erent transition patterns. This is reected in the wage o¤er and
earnings distributions. However, this inuences also the mapping from productiv-
ity to wages for men and women. Given there are imperfections in the market,
and women face higher level of search frictions, rms can o¤er di¤erent wages.
However, rms also o¤er di¤erent wages to workers with di¤erent productivity.
For men, lower level of search frictions indicates their labour supply elasticity is
higher, so that rms have to o¤er proportionally higher wages to attract or retain
them; on the contrary, women have much lower chances and even high productivity
rms do not need to o¤er the convex wage-productivity prole discussed above.
Again, this di¤erential result can be also attributed to the fact that here search
intensity doesnt vary at di¤erent part of the wage distribution.14
In general, above results indicate rms do exert a strong monopsony power
when posting wages. The latter is dened as the percentage di¤erence between
the wage and productivity and gives a direct measure of the degree of exploitation
of labour market frictions by rms when setting wages. The monopsony condition
can be theoretically identied as one of very low mobility and almost no search
while on-the-job. The model gives also a measure of the proportion of the rents
that accrue to workers when starting an employment relationship, or how far are
workers from being paid their marginal product p: Results indicate that rms are
able to extract almost all the surplus from their workers, in particular from women.
This can be easily interpreted in the theoretical framework proposed in this paper.
Given very low levels of on-the-job search and a few opportunities to move to better
paying jobs, rms are able to extract all the surplus from their workers paying
them wages just above their value of leisure. However, the pattern is somewhat
di¤erent for low productivity and high productivity rms. The mapping from
productivity to wages in Figure 2 indicates that high productivity rms o¤er to
14Allowing for di¤erent search intensities can have interesting implications for the shape of the
wage-productivity prole. This is left for future research.
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Figure 2: Mapping from Productivity to Wages, Percentiles
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men proportionally higher wages compared to those paid by rms in the lower part
of the distribution. For women that is not the case.
Previous results indicate that the degree of search frictions in Italian labour
market is considerable and is a relevant source of gender wage di¤erentials. Work-
ers face di¢ culties in climbing the job ladder and rms are able to exploit the
monopsony power that accrues to them because of the presence of information
problems in the market. Women su¤er more from this condition. Estimates of
transition parameters indicate that segmentation of the labour market by observ-
able characteristics of workers can help us to identify those groups that are more
severely damaged in this context. Results found for di¤erent age groups and for
di¤erent occupation categories conrm previous expectations and highlight impor-
tant di¤erences between men and women in their career paths.
3.4 The Relative E¤ect of Productivity, Search and Dis-
crimination
In this subsection, instead I follow estimation procedures from Bowlus and Eckstein
(2002). I solve the following system to estimate , u, e, and P to match moments
observed in the data.15 The reservation wage R is assumed to be the lowest wage
observed in the sample. The basic system, based on the theoretical model is
described below
1. unemployment duration
udur =
1
u
; (8)
2. unemployment rate
urate =

 + u
; (9)
3. proportion from job to unemployment
jtu =
e
( + e) ln(1 +
e

)
; (10)
4. average wage of cross section earnings distribution
EG(w) =
eP + R
e + 
: (11)
15I solve numerically the systems below with Maple. Detailed computations are available upon
request. As mentioned above, it should made also clear that estimation methods used in this
section do not take into account the counterfactual increasing density distributions generated by
the model. However, as discussed in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), the model is identied.
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Table 5: Means for Matching Moments Estimation
all men women
unemployment rate urate 0:17 0:16 0:18
unemployment duration udur 24:73 24:37 25:40
jobs to unemployment jtu 0:88 0:87 0:89
average earnings EG(w) 3249:34 3490:47 2815:12
average o¤ers EF (w) 2727:01 2857:94 2524:66
median G(w) 2833:04 3032:11 2573:56
reservation wage R 835 974 835
Time period is month. Monetary values are expressed in 000s of Italian Lira.
In Table 5 I report means for variables of interest.16 Descriptive statistics
show what women have somewhat higher non-employment rate and duration of
it. Note also the di¤erence between average earnings is higher than the di¤erence
between average o¤ers, 23% against 13%, indicating di¤erent e¤ects of transition
parameters on the distribution across men and women at di¤erent stages of their
careers.
General results deriving from the solution of the system above for the pooled
sample of matching moments estimation are reported in columns (4) and (5) of
Table 6. In columns (2) and (3), maximum likelihood nonparametric estimates
obtained in previous section are reported for comparison purposes. Results indicate
that maximum likelihood estimates are always higher. In particular, while arrival
rates of o¤ers are very similar across estimation methods, the destruction rate 
takes quite di¤erent values. Actually, using maximum likelihood methods it is
twice as high as the one estimated with matching techniques. However, for the
analysis of equilibrium wage di¤erentials, what is really important is the ratio
between the arrival rate of o¤ers and the job destruction rate ke = e=. In
this case, for males results are ke = 0:5 and ke = 0:32 for nonparametric and
matching methods respectively. For women, corresponding values are ke = 0:2
and ke = 0:26. Estimates with nonparametric methods indicate big di¤erences in
the speed of climbing the wage ladder, whereas these di¤erences are substantially
reduced when using matching moments.17 Finally, note that estimation of average
productivity with nonparametric methods turned in implausible high results, due
by di¢ culties in estimation of the earnings density. To analyse the di¤erential
e¤ect of productivity, search and discrimination, in next steps, I continue using
matching estimates.
16Data are from Tables 1 and 2.
17These estimates are not very di¤erent by those obtained by Jolivet et al. (2006) with ECHP
data for Italy. See also Sulis (2007) for details and extensive comparison.
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Table 6: ParametersComparison: Nonparametric and Matching Moments
Nonparametric Matching
Men Women Men Women
(2) (3) (4) (5)
 0:0128 0:0154 0:0078 0:0086
u 0:0431 0:0398 0:0410 0:0393
e 0:0064 0:0032 0:0025 0:0023
P 102; 583 87; 819 10; 691 9; 964
ke 0:5 0:2 0:32 0:26
R 974 835 974 835
udur 24:37 25:40 24:37 25:40
urate 0:16 0:18 0:16 0:18
jtu 0:87 0:89 0:87 0:89
EG(w) 3386 2760 3386 2760
Previous exercise gives interesting insights, however, it doesnt provide any
evidence on identication of the source of the gender wage di¤erential as discussed
in the preceding section. What I try to assess here is the extent to which di¤erent
sources of the wage di¤erentials contribute to the wage gender gap. I do this in the
following way. Parameters are divided in productivity parameters P , transition
parameters: u; ; e, and discrimination parameters: x, d, d: They are all dened
in the theoretical section. Note I allow transition parameters and productivity to
vary across men and women. The rst discrimination parameter x indicates if
rms search less intensively for women than for men. So, if rms search equally
x = 1, otherwise x < 1; d is the rm disutility parameter, and nally d is the
proportion of rms that discriminate (not necessarily the proportion of those that
do not hire women).
The detailed identication strategy for each computation is outlined below.18
1. In this case, there are no di¤erences in transition parameters M = W , no
di¤erences in productivity PM = PW and no discrimination x = 1, d = 0,
d = 0. It is relatively easy to solve the system of equations by referring to
mean values for the whole sample. The arrival rate of o¤ers while unemployed
u is identied from average unemployment duration udur in equation (8); the
arrival rate of o¤ers while unemployed e is identied from the proportion of
jobs terminating into unemployment jtu in equation (10). The (common) job
destruction rate  is identied from the unemployment rate uratein equation
(9). Given a common reservation wage R, estimated as the smallest observed
18Means for variables are reported in Table 5.
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wage in the sample, the value of the common productivity parameter P is
identied by the mean of the earnings distribution EG(w) in equation (11).
2. The second step allows productivity levels to di¤er across men and women
PM 6= PW while transition parameters M = W are estimated exactly as in
previous item (1). No discrimination is allowed at this stage, x = 1, d = 0,
d = 0. Given a common reservation wage R, di¤erent productivity levels
are identied by di¤erent average earnings for men and women EMG(w) and
EWG(w) respectively.
3. In a no discrimination scenario, x = 1, d = 0, d = 0, in this item, di¤erent
job destruction rates M and W are identied by using di¤erent unemploy-
ment rates for men and women after estimating a common arrival rate of of-
fers while unemployed u from average unemployment duration udur. Again,
arrival rates of o¤ers and productivity levels PM 6= PW , are estimated as in
item (2) by using di¤erent mean earnings for men and women and (common)
unemployment duration and the overall proportion of exits to unemployment
respectively.
4. Arrival rates, job destruction rates and di¤erent productivity levels are iden-
tied exactly as in (3) with PM 6= PW , M 6= W . The search intensity
for the two groups is the same by keeping x = 1. Discrimination is con-
sidered, whereas the two parameters d and d, that represent the disutility
parameter for discriminating rms and the proportion of them respectively,
are identied. The parameter d is identied by average value of the of-
fer distribution for women EWF (w) in equation (15) in the Appendix. The
parameter d is identied by the the women/men median wage di¤erential
by using GW (wmedian)=GM(wmedian) by using equations (13) and (12) in the
Appendix.
5. By considering di¤erent search intensities, at this point, it is imposed x =
0:85 so that di¤erent search intensity is revealed in di¤erent durations of
unemployment for men and women. In this case, d and d are identied as
in item (4). The arrival rates, di¤erent job destruction rates M 6= W , and
di¤erent productivities PM 6= PW , are identied as in previous scenario.19
6. Finally, the pure discrimination case identies transition parameters u; e
and M 6= W as in previous steps, and the common value of productivity
19The parameter x should be identied by di¤erent durations by using uWdur = 0(1 d(1 x)):
In this case I impose x = 0:85. For values of x < 0:85 the percentage of discriminating rms d
is very small. Actually for lower values of x, I do nd a solution for d, but no plausible solution
for d, that should satisfy the restriction d > pB  R:
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Table 7: Productivity, Search and Discrimination: Alternative Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
u 0:04043 0:04043 0:04043 0:04043 0:04103 0:04103
e 0:00247 0:00247 0:00254 0:00254 0:00258 0:00258
M 0:00828 0:00828 0:00770 0:00770 0:00781 0:00781
W 0:00828 0:00828 0:00887 0:00887 0:00864 0:00864
R 835 835 835 835 835 835
PM 11332 12381 11533 11533 11533 11533
PW 11332 9444 9726 9446 9446 11533
d 0 0 0 5503 5503  15478
d 0 0 0 0:1703 0:2703 0:2703
x 1 1 1 1 0:85 0:85
Monetary values are expressed in 000s of Italian Lira.
PM = PW ; from average earnings for the whole sample. Discrimination
parameters are identied as follows: the parameter d is identied by average
value of the o¤er distribution for women EWF (w) in equation (15); d from mean
earnings for females EWG(w) using equation (17) in the Appendix, and x = 0:85
is imposed.
Results are summarised in Table 7 in di¤erent columns. First, comparison of
results from column (1) and (2) indicates that not considering productivity di¤er-
entials can miss important things. Infact, in the second step, introducing di¤er-
ences in productivity, women have much lower measures of productivity parameter
to account for the observed wage di¤erential. Allowing both productivity and job
destruction rates to be di¤erent (in 3) indicates that productivity for women is
not as lower as estimated before in column (2) and that their destruction rate is
higher. In column (4), the role of discrimination is considered. Although the inten-
sity of recruitment activity for both workers is the same, there is a proportion of
prejudiced rms (17%) having a disutility parameter upon hiring women. Then, in
column (5), I include discrimination as a possible explanation of wage di¤erentials
and di¤erent unemployment durations for the two groups. Note that the propor-
tion of discriminating rm increases. The arrival rates di¤er between men and
women, and results indicate that productivity of women is about 19% lower than
productivity of men; about 27% of rms discriminate when hiring and their disu-
tility parameter is equal to about 47% of malesproductivity parameter. Finally,
in column (6) the pure discrimination case is considered with equal productivity;
however note results are not plausible, with a negative disutility parameter.
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It is interesting to compare these results with those obtained by Bowlus and
Eckstein (2002) and Flabbi (2005) for racial and gender di¤erentials in the US
labour market respectively. The former paper estimates blacks productivity to be
about 3.3% lower than the productivity of white workers with a disutility taste
parameter equal to 31% of the productivity of whites. The proportion of discrim-
inating rms is equal to 56%. The paper by Flabbi (2005) estimates that about
half of employers are prejudiced and the productivity of women is 6.5% lower than
the estimated parameter for men. The disutility factor is estimated to be about
36% of mens productivity.
Previous results indicate search, productivity and discrimination have impor-
tant roles in shaping the gender wage di¤erential. However, it is important to
provide a measure of their relative contributions. This decomposition exercise is
provided in some important studies in the equilibrium search literature. In a model
of search with heterogeneity in productivity but no discrimination, Van den Berg
and Ridder (1998) nd that about 73% of wage variance is due to productivity
variation, while the rest is due to search frictions. They suggest this is in line
with the R2 from standard wage regressions. On the other hand, Bowlus (1997)
nds that behavioural di¤erences, as reected in di¤erent transition parameters,
account for about 2030% of the di¤erential. More specically, decomposition of
wage o¤er means shows the search components account for around 20%, while this
component is about 30% for the earnings distribution.
To calculate the relative contribution of search, productivity and discrimina-
tion, using equations from (14) to (17) in the Appendix, and previous parameters
estimates, I calculate predicted mean wage o¤ers and earnings for both men and
women respectively. Di¤erent scenarios allowing for di¤erent components are pre-
sented. First note that the raw wage o¤er gap is equal to 0.88 against the earnings
gap of 0.81. This is not surprising as the e¤ect of the three components on the gen-
der gap can be di¤erent after some experience accumulated in the labour market.
In Table 8 I report results for simulations.20
As I said before, interestingly, the gap is di¤erent for wage o¤ers and earnings
distributions. The procedure to calculate relative contributions is the following.
I assume in absence of all forces, there is no gender di¤erential. First, I look at
earnings distribution. From row (1) I calculate 0.22 as the role of productivity
by subtracting 1-0.78; then from (2) I obtain 0.11 as the contribution of search
di¤erences. The sum of discrimination and productivity is obtained by (5) as
0.35, then discrimination is calculated as di¤erence 0.35-0.22, this gives 0.13, the
latter is the contribution of discrimination. Then I compare results in (3) and
(4) with predictions for the e¤ect of search and productivity (0.33) and search
20Note that numering doesnt necessarily correspond to those in used to in Table 7 to calculate
transition, productivity and discrimination parameters.
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Table 8: Predicted Wage O¤ers and Earnings Gaps
Components wage offer gap
EW
F (w)
EM
F (w)
earnings gap
EW
G(w)
EM
G(w)
1)
no search
yes productivity
no discrimination
0.78 0.78
2)
yes search
no productivity
no discrimination
0.90 0.89
3)
yes search
yes productivity
no discrimination
0.73 0.72
4)
yes search
no productivity
yes discrimination
0.88 0.78
5)
no search
yes productivity
yes discrimination
0.74 0.65
and discrimination (0.23). It turns out that in (3) there is small di¤erence and
in (4) the t is good. Finally I can calculate the relative contributions of search,
productivity and discrimination in the two cases, both for wage o¤ers and earnings
distribution.
Results indicate di¤erences for wage o¤ers and earnings. In the rst case the
percentages are as follows: 61% for productivity, 28% for search and 11% for
discrimination, in the second case these are 48%, 24% and 28%. Interestingly,
productivity di¤erences are more relevant for wage o¤ers than for earnings, while
discrimination is much more important to explain the earnings gap. The role of
search behaviour is very similar in both cases.21
4 Conclusions
This paper provides estimates of the relevant frictional parameters of the equilib-
rium search model to analyse gender wage di¤erentials. Two di¤erent versions of
the model are estimated. The rst is a model in which men and women are in
21Note these results are in line with those found by Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) and
Bowlus (1997).
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separate markets but rms are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity
parameter. The second one, is a model without a distribution of productivity but
where men and women can have di¤erent productivity levels and discrimination is
explicitly taken into account.
The rst model is estimated assuming an exogenous continuous distribution of
rmsproductivity to get a good t of the wage distribution. First, the earnings
distribution is estimated non-parametrically; then these estimates are used to re-
cover frictional parameters using maximum likelihood methods. Conditional on
previous steps, in the third stage, an estimate of the productivity distribution is
provided. Results indicate that search frictions are important source of the gen-
der wage di¤erential. The quantitative measure of search frictions indicates that
men climb the wage ladder much faster than women. Looking at di¤erent age
groups, it turns out that this speed increases and then decreases with experience
for men, while it is always increasing for women. This can indicate that labour
market transitions of women can be inuenced by many factors, including the fam-
ily environment and child rearing. For both groups, wages are increasing function
of productivity levels; however, while for men the relationship is not linear, for
women is almost linear. In other words, rms with high productivity are able to
o¤er proportionally higher wages to men to retain or attract them, they do not
need to do it for women.
When estimating the model with taste discrimination and no heterogeneity in
the productivity distribution, results indicate the relative contribution of search,
productivity and discrimination is di¤erent for the wage o¤er and earnings distri-
bution. In the rst case, productivity accounts for 61% of wage di¤erentials, while
the part of search is 28% and 11% is the component of discrimination. The earn-
ings distribution is di¤erently a¤ected: the relative contributions are 48%, 24%
and 28% respectively. Interestingly, productivity di¤erences are more relevant for
wage o¤ers than for earnings distribution, while discrimination is much more im-
portant to explain the earnings gap. The role of search behaviour is very similar
in both cases.
This paper contributes to the literature dealing with the structural estimation
of equilibrium search models. It also proposes an application of such models to
study gender labour market di¤erentials in terms of wages and unemployment
in Italy. To the extent that gender di¤erentials are also widely recognised in
all labour markets, studying the di¤erent sources of wage di¤erentials (search,
productivity and discrimination) is important to shed some light on possible policy
interventions to reduce wage and unemployment inequalities. In particular, some
policy experiments as equal pay policies or a¢ rmative actions can be implemented
in such an environment.
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Appendix
Equations used for matching moments are from Bowlus and Eckstein (2002); I
report them below. As in the rest of the paper, G(w) denotes the earnings distri-
bution, F (w) is the wage o¤er distribution, E denotes expectations. Note that A
stands for men M and B stands for women W . The parameter k is equal to x in
the text, 1 = e, 0 = u; p is productivity and R is the reservation wage.
GM(wmedian) =
1
z1A
 
pA  RA
pA   wmedian
0:5
  1
!
(12)
GW (wmedian) =
z0B
z1B  w0B
 
pB   d RB
pB   d  wmedian
0:5
  1
!
(13)
EMF (w) =
z1A(3 + 2z1A)pA + (3 + 3z1A + (z1A)
2)(RA)
3(1 + z1A)2
(14)
EWF (w) =
(z1B)(3 + 2  z1B)pB + (3 + 3z1B + (z1B)2)(RB)
3(1 + z1B)2
+
(kz1Bdd(2(1 + z1B(1  d))) + (kz1Bd)  (2(1 + z1B(1  d))2(1 + w1B)2))
3w1B(1 + z1B(1  d))2(1 + w1B)2
(15)
EMG(w) =
(z1ApA) + (RA)
(1 + z1A)
(16)
EWG(w) =

(1  d)(1 + w1B)
(1  d + kd)

z1B(1  d)pB
(1 + z1B(1  d))2
+
RB
(1 + w1B)2

+

dk
(1  d + kd)(1 + w1B)

(kz1Bd)(pB   d)
(1 + z1B(1  d))
+RB

+

(d)(1  d)kz1B(1 + w1B)(2 + (2  z1B(1  d) + kz1Bd))(pB   d)
(1  d + kd)(1 + w1B)2(1 + z1B(1  d))2

(17)
where z1A = 1A ; z1B =
1
B
; z0A =
0
A
; z0B =
0
B
; w1B = (z1B)
k; w1A = (z1A)
k; w0B =
(z0B)
k; w0A = (z0A)
k:
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